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Uncertainty in Budget Projections
Summary
January 2001 budget reports from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) project new 10-year (FY2002-2011)
cumulative total baseline surpluses ranging from $4.996 trillion (OMB) to $5.610
trillion (CBO).  The projections assume no changes in current policy, follow the
constraints on baseline estimates imposed by law, include assumptions about
underlying economic (and some budget) conditions over the next 10 years, and
include assumptions about how the budget will interact with those underlying
economic conditions.   
These projections, as acknowledged by both agencies, are not meant to predict
future budget outcomes.  They provide a set of numbers against which proposed and
adopted policy changes can be measured. CBO in its January 2001 budget report is
very clear about the uncertainties surrounding its “midrange” baseline budget
projections for the fiscal years 2002 through 2011.  In its chapter on budget
uncertainty, it states,
... the outlook for the budget can best be described not as the single row of
numbers presented in CBO tables but as a fan of probabilities around those
numbers.  The fan widens as the projection extends.1
Budget estimates and projections cannot be more accurate than the information
that is needed to create them.  This underlying information – future economic
conditions and how the budget and the economy will interact in the future – cannot
be known with certainty since it comes from assumptions about the future.  The
outcome of the budget estimating process is the best guess of the likeliest outcome
for the government’s receipts, outlays, and surplus (or deficit) with the expectation,
nonetheless, that even the best guess is likely to differ from the eventual actual
amounts.
One can get a sense of how uncertain budget projections are by examining some
of those made previously.  In January 1992, CBO projected a deficit of $322 billion
for fiscal year (FY) 2000.  The budget in FY2000 actually produced a surplus of $236
billion.  This substantial change resulted almost exclusively from differences between
the underlying assumptions – future economic conditions and the interaction of the
economy and the budget – used in the original projections and those that actually
occurred.  CBO’s budget reports indicate that very little of the budgetary change over
those years resulted from legislation.        
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Uncertainty in Budget Projections
Part of the budget debate over the last two years has centered on what should
be done with projected surpluses, particularly the on-budget surpluses, over the next
10 years.2  The official budget projections show potentially huge surpluses during the
coming decade.  The Clinton Administration’s final budget document, released in mid-
January 2001 by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), projected that
baseline total surpluses would rise from $237 billion in 2000 to $810 billion in 2011
or from 2.4% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2001 to 4.6% of GDP in 2011.3,
4  The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) January 2001 budget report projects a
2011 baseline total surplus of $889 billion.5  The cumulative 10-year total surplus
(2002 through 2011) as projected by OMB and following the constraints built into the
baseline projections, reaches $4,996 billion, split between $2,445 billion in cumulative
on-budget surplus and $2,551 billion in cumulative off-budget surplus.6  CBO’s 10-
year cumulative surplus reaches $5,610 billion, split between $3,122 billion in on-
budget surpluses and $2,488 billion in off-budget surpluses. 
Proposals to use the on-budget surpluses range from large tax cuts to various
spending increases, to no policy changes that would retain the whole surplus to
reduce federal debt.7  Any use of the surpluses for tax cuts or spending increases takes
funds away from debt reduction.  Proposals that have appeared in the last two years
would use some portion of the projected on-budget surplus for spending increases or
tax cuts, but would leave all of the off-budget and a significant part of the on-budget
surplus for debt reduction.  Opponents of the proposals to use large amounts of the
on-budget surpluses point to the likelihood that, among other things, the proposed
policy changes will have results different from those expected because the proposals
and the expected results are based on 10-year budget and economic projections that
are themselves inherently uncertain. They point out that CBO stated in its January
2001 budget report that:
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Looking forward five or 10 years allows the Congress to consider the longer-term
budgetary implications of policy changes.  But it also increases the likelihood that
budgetary decisions will be made on the basis of projections that later turn out to
have been far wrong.8
There is concern that a large change in policy now, especially one that uses much
of the on-budget surplus, based on inherently wobbly 10-year budget projections,
might lead to serious budgetary or fiscal problems sometime during or after that
period.  This part of the argument about whether or not to institute major policy
changes has little to do with the value of the proposed changes to society.  Instead,
the focus is on an uncertain 10-year budget outlook on which to base the decision.
If one accepts the (relative) accuracy of the budget projections, the debate over policy
changes moves to whether they are good or bad for the Nation, along with the
debates over the details of the proposal(s).  If one worries about the (relative)
accuracy of the budget projections, then the debate may remain focused on the
possible appropriateness or inappropriateness of major long-term policy change.9
The Inevitability of Uncertain Budget Projections
The future is unknown.  Attempts to predict the future are inherently uncertain.
The budget estimates and forecasts produced by CBO and OMB, especially those
looking five to 10 years into the future are unlikely to be any more than
approximations of what that future might look like.  Assuming that these projections
are accurate or that they approximate the most likely future outcome, they may lead
to substantial errors in policy decisions.  CBO includes a chapter, The Uncertainty of
Budget Projections, in its January 2001 budget report.
The many difficulties of producing the estimates and projections are generally
acknowledged by both CBO and OMB in their respective budget reports.  In 2001,
CBO included two alternative budget projections for its mid-range baseline estimate
in its budget report.  The “alternative scenarios” were based on substantial differences
in the economic and technical assumptions underlying the projections.10  These
alternatives produce large differences in budgetary outcomes.  OMB documents in the
President’s budget show the effects on the budget of changes in selected economic
variables such as real economic growth, the rate of inflation, or interest rates over five
years.
The alternative budget projections from CBO hint at the difficulties these
organizations face in producing budget estimates and projections.  The complexities
of the budget itself need to be meshed with the budget’s interactions with and






































































Figure 1.  CBO Projections for FY2000
Beginning in January 1992
(in billions of dollars)
Source: CBO Budget
reports, various years.
budgeting to produce budget estimates and projections.  Both CBO and OMB have
developed budget models that attempt to reflect the budget and its interactions with
the economy and the population.  They use past patterns of interactions combined
with economic and other expectations to produce the short-term estimates and longer-
term projections of the government’s budget.  
Fiscal Year 2000 Projections and Estimates
Fiscal year 2000 ended on September 30, 2000.  The actual budget results for
that year put the surplus at $326 billion, total receipts at $2,025 billion, and outlays
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from  its annual
winter (usually
J a n u a r y )  a n d
summer ( these
reports have ranged
f rom May  t o
September) budget
reports for the
period 1992 through 2000.  The rules CBO needed to follow at that time (and still
needs to follow) in constructing its baseline estimates and projections can affect the
estimate’s accuracy.  These rules included assuming no policy change from existing
government policy, that the existing discretionary spending caps (the ones in place at
the time of the estimate or projections) would be achieved, and that various expiring
policy provisions would be allowed to expire whether or not that was actually likely
to happen.  
The President’s budget documents provide a five-year history of FY2000
projections.  The President’s FY1996 budget (February 6, 1995) projected a FY2000
deficit of $194 billion, receipts of $1,711 billion and outlays of $1,905 billion.  Figure
2 parallels Figure 1 data from CBO, presenting the Administration’s projections of the




















































Figure 2.  Administration Projections for FY2000
Beginning in February 1995
(in billions of dollars)
Source: Administration
Budgets, various years.
February 1995 through June 2000.  Unlike CBO’s estimates and projections, the
OMB budget estimates incorporated proposed or expected policy changes into its
forecasts.  Other differences between the two agencies’ projections include estimating
techniques and assumptions, such as their respective economic outlooks, all of which
contribute to the differences between their projections over the years. 
The underlying reason for the changes in budget estimates over time is that the
information needed to make the estimates is available only in the unknown future.
The projections and estimates rely on assumptions about future economic conditions
and policy decisions and the various interactions of the budget with these factors.  As
the estimates are revised over time, CBO, in its budget reports, provides estimates in
three categories to explain the differences between the previous and current estimates.
T h e s e  t h r e e
categories that CBO
uses are: the effects
on the budget of
r e c e n t  p o l i c y
changes; the effects
of change on the
b u d g e t  f r o m
changes in forecast
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s p e n d i n g  o r
receipts.  The effect
of economic changes, such as faster or slower real growth, or higher or lower
employment or interest rates, or change in productivity growth, makes up the second
category.  The third category, technical revisions, is a catchall for the factors that do
not fit neatly into the first two groupings.  CBO states that the technical revisions 
are defined as any changes that are not ascribed to new legislation or to changes
in the macroeconomic forecast. Technical changes could be economic in nature but
are not tied to CBO’s economic forecast.... A variety of other factors could also
produce technical changes, such as revised assumptions about the number of
people who will qualify to receive various benefits, different estimates of the level
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Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA-93) would have been fully incorporated into the CBO
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of benefits they will use, and adjustments to the rate at which discretionary
programs will spend their budget authority.11
Over the nine-year period 1992 through 2000, the economy consistently
performed better than expected.  CBO assumed in 1992 that real economic growth
would stay at around 2% a year for the 1998-2002 period, that unemployment would
remain about 5.5%, and that short-term interest rates would stick at 5.6%.  For the
years 1998 through 2000, the actual variables showed real economic growth rates
averaged almost 4.3%, the unemployment rate averaged 4.1%, and short-term interest
rates averaged 5.1%.  The substantially better than originally forecast economic
conditions contributed significantly to the improved budget outcome for FY2000.12
Faster than projected economic growth combined with lower than expected
unemployment rates increased federal revenues (above the expected levels) reduced
federal spending (below the expected levels) in numerous federal unemployment-
related programs during these years.   
The faster economic growth also contributed indirectly to the shrinking deficits
and growing surpluses by altering the technical revisions, especially for revenues.
Incomes grew larger, pushing large numbers of taxpayers into higher tax brackets.
The larger incomes combined with the movement into higher tax brackets rapidly
increased federal revenues above expectations, especially during the last several years.
CBO’s tables showing the causes of the changes in the budget estimates attribute
slightly more of the change to changes in economic conditions and somewhat less to
technical revisions.  Only a  small amount of the difference is shown coming from
legislative changes at least during the last few years.13
Current Estimates and Projections
The most recent 10-year budget projections from CBO and OMB, from the
January 2001 reports (no specific date has been set for the presentation of the Bush
Administration’s new budget proposals), continue to indicate extraordinarily positive
expectations for the budget throughout the forecast period.  CBO shows the total
surplus rising from $236 billion in FY2000 to $889 billion in FY2011 (in its midrange
baseline projections “for the economy and the budget, based on past and current
CRS-6
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Figure 3.  Surplus Projections, FY2000-2011
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billion in the Clinton
Administration’s
f i n a l  b u d g e t
document and to
$558 billion in the
CBO report in
FY2011. Figure 3
provides the path of
the total and on-
budget baseline
surplus projections
for the period 2000
through 2011.
CBO fully discusses the uncertainty of the 10-year budget projections in its
budget reports.  In its summer 2000 budget report, CBO stated:
[The] long time horizon...increases the likelihood that substantial discrepancies
will emerge between actual results and projections.  Since each year’s estimates
build on those of the previous year, longer projection periods imply a greater
chance that errors will compound and will produce more uncertainty in the
estimates used to make policy decisions.15
In its January 2001 budget report, CBO stated:
... considerable uncertainty surrounds...[budget and economic] projections for two
reasons.  First, future legislation is likely to alter the paths of federal spending and
revenues.  Second, the U.S. economy and the federal budget are highly complex
and are affected by many economic and technical factors that are difficult to
predict.  As a result, actual budgetary outcomes will almost certainly differ from
the Congressional Budget Office’s baseline projections.16
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OMB is generally less explicit than CBO in its reports about the uncertainty of
its budget projections, but the President’s budget contains information on the effects
of different economic conditions on the budget.  In the Economic Assumptions
chapter in the Analytical Perspectives volume of the FY2001 budget (February 2000),
OMB states:
Both receipts and outlays are affected by changes in economic conditions.
This sensitivity seriously complicates budget planning, because errors in economic
assumptions lead to errors in the budget projections.17
The final Clinton Administration budget document included a chapter (Current
Services Estimates and the Pending Policy Agenda) that discusses some of the
anomalies of the budget baseline rules and how they create some of the inaccuracies
in the estimates.  For instance, since errors should be expected in the economic
assumptions used in the budget projections, errors in the budget projections should
also be expected.  This does not imply that budget projections are of no use, only that
they need to be used with caution with regard to their predictive ability. 
Other observers noted problems that they found with the 10-year budget
forecasts.  Alan Auerbach and William Gale, in a report on expected budget surpluses
and tax cut proposals in the publication Tax Notes, state that: 
The short-term (10-year) on-budget surplus is based on what we regard as
unrealistically low assumptions regarding the level and path of real discretionary
spending.  The surplus is also based on the assumption that recent increases in tax
revenues relative to GDP will largely prove permanent.18
A report from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities contends that CBO’s
baseline projections overstate the size of the surplus expected over the next 10
years.19  The report argues, among other things, that discretionary spending has been
and continues to grow at rates greater than inflation and that the budget creation rules
under which CBO and OMB produce their baseline estimates do not reflect this.  The
report further argues that the rules governing scheduled future changes in revenues
and mandatory spending are not realistic.   The rules require that revenue provisions
that are scheduled to expire be allowed to, even if the provision has been reauthorized
repeatedly in the past.  A smaller surplus slows the fall in federal debt held by the
public, which in turn slows the fall in the government’s interest payments.  The higher
interest payments further erode the expected surpluses.
Reasonable Variations in Factors Affecting the Budget.  There are an
almost endless number of reasonable variations in the multitude of factors underlying
the budget projections.  These alternative assumptions  are not necessarily more or
CRS-8

















Figure 4.  CBO’s Alternative 
Scenarios, FY2000-2011
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tax collections) can also have substantial effects on the budget projections. 
 CBO’s January 2001 budget report (as in the one from January 2000) included
what CBO labeled as “alternative scenarios about future trends” in the budget.  These
consisted of taking its midrange baseline and adjusting it for two “apparently
reasonable” alternative economic paths.  As CBO put it, these are, 
referred to as the optimistic and pessimistic trend scenarios...[and] are intended to
reflect assumptions that – although systematically different from the ones in the
baseline projection – still seem reasonable to CBO analysts.20
The surpluses over the 10 years of the optimistic and pessimistic alternatives and the
midrange baseline are shown in figure 4.  The wide spread in the outcome is indicative
of the range of possibilities that might occur under reasonable differences in
underlying economic and technical assumptions.  CBO’s budget report includes a
diagram containing an even wider range of possible outcomes for the surplus and
deficit through 2006.  The extremes, with small probabilities of occurring, produce
larger surpluses than the optimistic scenario and smaller surpluses (and even deficits)
































Figure 5.  CBO Projections of the Percentage




The differences in many of these underlying assumptions do not necessarily seem




at 3.2% a year
rather than 2.7% in
the baseline and
the (historical)
1.5% a year in the
p e s s i m i s t i c
scenario.  The













a s s u m e s  a
continuation of the
i n c r e a s e  i n
p e r s o n a l  t a x
liabilities while the pessimistic scenario expects them to fade away over time.  Even
this wide range of outcome possibilities is not necessarily wide enough.  Among other
substantial variations that can occur in the underlying factors, CBO notes that the
current uncertainty over predicting future productivity growth and the large effect
differences in this variable can have on future budget outcomes.  Figure 5 provides
a visual history of the variability in CBO’s estimates of the percentage change in real
GDP for (calendar year) 2000.  The period covers six years beginning in January
1995.
There are other possibilities in addition to variations in the underlying economic
and technical factors.  Congress and the President may agree on major changes to tax
or spending policies.  This past year saw the adoption of appropriation legislation for
FY2001 that exceeded the amount needed to keep pace with inflation.  A continuation
of this pattern, which some observers believe is likely, would increase discretionary
spending above the amounts in the current projections.  In addition, as pointed out in
the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities report, increasing discretionary spending
at the rate of inflation would still let it “... decline in purchasing power on a per-
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Figure 6.  Total Receipts, Total Outlays, and
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offsets, reduce the size of the projected surpluses.  The same would be true of any
legislation that increases spending above or reduces revenues below the levels
foreseen in the existing projections.  (Legislation could also be adopted that reduces
spending or increases revenues from the levels in the projections, thereby probably
increasing the surpluses and speeding the reduction in federal debt held by the public.)
In relative terms, several components of the federal budget are projected to reach
levels of GDP that have not been seen since the early 1950s.  Total federal spending
is projected to fall to 15.6% of GDP from 18.2% in 2000.  This would put total
federal outlays at their lowest level since 1951.  At the same time, revenues would
remain at or near 20.0% of GDP throughout the decade, a level reached only during
World War II and approached in 1969 (19.7%) and in 1981 (19.6%).  Figure 6 shows
total receipts and outlays as a percentage of GDP between 1965 and fiscal year 2011
(using the CBO January 2001 baseline projections).  The figure also shows
discretionary spending as a percentage of GDP.
As has already been mentioned, the future direction of discretionary spending is
also in doubt.  The CBO projections show discretionary spending continuing a decline
as a share of GDP.  This follows a pattern that has occurred sporadically since the end
CRS-11
of the Viet Nam War and accelerated in the late 1980s.  The pattern is shown in
Figure 6.  In some analysts’ opinion (see above), the likelihood of keeping
discretionary spending on this path, given pressures to increase defense and other
components of discretionary spending, may prove difficult.
Whether these historically unusual levels of spending and receipts will actually
occur (or can be maintained) may depend on how much the nature of the economy
and technical aspects of the budget have actually changed in the last decade.  If the
last decade’s budget environment is only a deviation from the norm and that deviation
ends, the budget will shortly begin to reflect that norm and may revert to more
historic percentages of GDP.  If the environment in which the budget exists has
undergone a fundamental shift in nature, these new spending and revenue levels as
percentages of GDP may be sustainable, if the public wishes to sustain them.  The
uncertainty about whether a fundamental shift has occurred also contributes to the
uncertainty of the budget projections.
Conclusion
Federal budget projections and estimates have become a significant part of the
congressional budget debates and broader congressional debates over future policies.
The supporting assumptions that CBO and OMB and others must use to construct the
projected future paths for spending and revenue and their respective components are
themselves highly uncertain and changeable.  The fundamental issue with all the
estimates and projections is that almost nothing about the future can be known with
any real certainty.  
Certain aspects of what will happen in the future can be forecast with reasonable
accuracy, such as knowing, approximately,  the number of people retiring in the next
20 years.  This can provide a reasonably solid base from which to estimate the future
level of retirement benefits.  But it cannot be completely accurate and it covers only
part of the budget.  Too much remains unknown.  Will a change in economic
conditions change retirement decisions?  How will inflation affect the calculations?
How accurate is the forecast for the need for and cost of medical care for those
retiring?  Longer life expectancy or medical breakthroughs can substantially alter
future spending levels.  These are the problems that underlie both the budget
projections and the assumptions needed to make those projections.  There is no way
of assuring that the underlying assumptions used in the projections, the assumptions
about real economic growth, productivity growth, inflation, interest rates, bad
weather for farmers, natural disasters, military emergencies, scientific breakthroughs,
or how any other thing that might affect the budget, will match what actually occurs.
Errors in any or all of these assumptions can throw off the budget projections by
large or small amounts, especially in the budget projections that run 10 years (or
more) into the future.  In January 1995, CBO assumed that real economic growth
would be 2.3% in calendar year 2000.  Real economic growth that year was 5.2%.
This mis-projection of an underlying assumption contributed to the differences
between the originally forecast budget numbers and those that actually occurred.
CBO projected a deficit of $297 billion for FY2000 in January 1995; the government
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ended FY2000 with a surplus of $236 billion.22  It is reasonable to be concerned that
the current projections for FY2010 or FY2011 may not be any more accurate than
those of the past.
